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Introduction
Partial defences are special defences only available in England & Wales to defendants charged with
murder. They include provocation, diminished responsibility, infanticide and killing pursuant to a suicide
pact. These are known as the ‘voluntary manslaughters’ where homicide with intent otherwise sufficient
for murder (‘malice aforethought’) is reduced to manslaughter because of defined mitigating
circumstances2. Provocation and diminished responsibility have proved most problematic and will be the
focus of this article. The mitigating factors arise from abnormal mental states, and psychiatric evidence
has been at the centre of disputes regarding these defences. In this journal, Kerrigan set out recent
problems that have developed with provocation in case law3. The degree to which mental disorder can
be considered when deciding the standard of behaviour required of the defendant who pleads
‘provocation’ has fluctuated markedly in recent years. Diminished responsibility, on the other hand, has
aroused concern, inter alia, over its expansive use to cover a wide range of mental conditions,4 and the
frequency with which expert psychiatrists comment on the ‘ultimate issue’ of whether all limbs of the test
are met5. Both problems might be said to arise from vague terms in the statutory definition that are
incompatible with contemporary psychiatric practice.
Following the controversial case of R v Smith (Morgan James)6, which permitted mental disorder a much
greater effect on provocation, the United Kingdom Government asked the Law Commission7 (‘the
Commission’) to consider and report on the law and practice of the partial defences provided for by the
1 Specialist Registrar in Forensic Psychiatry, East Midlands
Centre for Forensic Mental Health, Arnold Lodge, Leicester.
2 Ormerod D (2005) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (11th
Ed). Oxford University Press: Oxford: 471.
3 Kerrigan K (2006) Provocation: the fall (and rise) of
objectivity. Journal of Mental Health Law May: 44.
4 Editorial ‘Partial Defences to Murder’ [2004] Criminal
Law Review: 1
5 Mitchell B (1997b) Putting diminished responsibility law
into practice: a forensic psychiatric perspective. Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry. 8(3): 620.
6 R v Smith (Morgan James)7 [2001] 1 AC 146
7 The Law Commission is an independent statutory body
created by the Law Commissions Act 1965 to keep the
law under review and assist with reform. The Commission
conducts research and consultations in order to make
recommendations to Parliament. More than two thirds of
the Commission’s recommendations for reform have been
implemented (www.lawcom.gov.uk).
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Homicide Act 1957. This progressed to investigation into wider homicide law and a process of consultation
and review which has now passed to the Ministry of Justice. This paper will outline briefly the review
process before considering in greater detail the current proposals for new definitions of provocation and
diminished responsibility. The Commission would like these to exist within a radically re-structured law
of homicide. The implications for mentally disordered defendants and therefore expert psychiatric
opinion will be considered.
Partial Defences to Murder: Consultation Paper (2003)8 & Final Report (2004)9
The Law Commission had long considered the law of murder in need of review10. However, a wholesale
revision was outside its initial terms of reference and so it first considered partial defences in relative
isolation. The Commission recommended new principles to govern a reformed provocation defence
which omitted reference to the problematic ‘reasonable man’ whose mental characteristics had been
causing the courts so many problems11. It also considered a new defence of ‘excessive use of force in self-
defence’, principally to benefit female domestic violence victims, but ultimately preferred instead to
reformulate provocation in such a way as to afford better justice to this type of defendant. In contrast, in
this first review the Commission recommended no change to the statute definition of diminished
responsibility for as long as the law of murder remained unchanged and conviction resulted in a
mandatory sentence. However, it suggested a reformulation for further consultation which replaced the
problematic concept of ‘mental responsibility’ (which many experts felt was outwith the expertise of
psychiatrists) with a substantial impairment of capacity to understand, judge and exert self-control.
Notably, the Commission’s overarching recommendation to the Government was to review the law of
homicide as a whole, including the mandatory sentence for murder. It argued the laws of voluntary
manslaughter needed to be reviewed alongside those of murder to ensure coherence between the two12.
A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (2005)13 & Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006)14
Consultation
The Law Commission was granted its first wish and invited to review various elements of murder,
including the partial defences. The consultation did not examine euthanasia, suicide or abortion, except
as they formed part of murder as the Commission believe the fundamental issues involved require
separate debate. It also considered creating a new partial defence of duress, which is uniquely unavailable
to the charge of murder in England and Wales15. The Commission was asked to involve key stakeholders
such as the public, criminal justice practitioners, academics, those who work with victims’ families,
parliamentarians and faith groups and accordingly a significant contribution was made by the Royal
College of Psychiatrists as well as individual psychiatrists.
8 Law Commission (2003) Partial Defences to Murder:
Consultation Paper. Law Com No. 173, TSO, London.
9 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder:
Final Report. Law Com No. 290, TSO, London.
10 Ibid, para 1.1.
11 Ibid, para 1.13.
12 Ibid, para 1.12.
13 Law Commission (2005) A New Homicide Act for
England and Wales? An Overview. Law Com No. 177,
TSO, London.
14 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London.
15 It is available to other charges in this jurisdiction.
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The Law Commission’s wishes were not, however, all granted. Pointedly, its terms of reference did not
include the mandatory sentence. The Commission neatly sidestep this restriction by proposing a grading
of homicide and reserving the mandatory sentence for ‘first degree murder’, thereby creating space for
other (second degree) murderers to be subject to flexible sentencing. This legal dexterity has been
described as “a risky subterfuge”16.
Structure of Homicide Law
The Law Commission reported in November 2006. Underpinning all of its other recommendations is a
fundamental change to the structure of homicide law. It found widespread support (including from the Royal
College of Psychiatrists) for its proposal to introduce a ‘ladder’ of offences creating degrees of murder and so
change the distinction between murder and manslaughter that is almost certainly over 500 years old17. 
The existing two-tier structure of homicide law is depicted below:
Fig. 1 Current Structure of Homicide
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16 Wilson W. (2006) The Structure of Criminal Homicide. Criminal Law Review: 471.
17 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para 1.32.
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Within this structure there are two tiers of general offences (murder and manslaughter) in addition to
specific offences including one based on psychiatric factors (infanticide). 
The Commission finds the two-tier structure struggling to accommodate “changing and deepening
understanding of the nature and degree of criminal fault and the emergence of new partial defences” and feels a
more finely graded structure would be better equipped to handle these stresses and strains18. It emphasises
the 1957 Act represented little more than tinkering with the existing law that elbowed a new defence of
diminished responsibility into the existing structure. 
The Commission prefers the three-tier structure of homicide it advocated from the beginning of the
consultation exercise:
* Killing where offender intended to cause serious injury and killing where offender intended to cause
some injury or a fear or risk of injury, and was aware of a serious risk of causing death.
Fig. 2 Structure of Homicide Proposed by Law Commission
Under the new proposals, provocation or diminished responsibility would only reduce first degree murder
to second degree murder. Partial defences would not be available to second degree murder or be able to
reduce first degree murder all the way to manslaughter. The traditional justification for partial defences
has been twofold. Firstly, they have allowed some sentencing flexibility. Secondly, they prevent less
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culpable offenders from being ‘labelled’ as murderers. In advocating this new three-tier structure, the Law
Commission has made it quite clear that it views the primary and only essential reason for having partial
defences is to circumvent the mandatory sentence19. The debate around ‘fair labelling’ is given only brief
consideration and described as, “of secondary importance compared to the sentence mitigation principle”20. The
Commission state that when an offender kills with the fault element for first degree murder but
successfully pleads a partial defence, he or she still ought to be convicted of an offence of ‘murder’. This
is a major departure from the current position, of course, and has been criticised by legal academics21.
Ashworth finds difficulty in the attempt to group five different types of offence together in the category
of second degree murder. This would include the three previous types of voluntary manslaughter and
some cases which would currently meet a murder charge. Ashworth is willing to accept that current law
is too generous to some reckless killings (involuntary manslaughters), but argues that if the culpability in
such cases is so high, perhaps provocation and diminished responsibility cases should not receive the same
label. This becomes an argument for an even more finely graded homicide law with perhaps four tiers,
including a separate one for successful partial defences, which could be given a label such as ‘culpable
homicide’ – a term borrowed from Scots law22.
The Commission justify witholding partial defences from second degree murder, believing they are not
necessary for offences where the sentence will not be fixed by law. The Commission also cites concerns
of the Royal College of Psychiatrists regarding the distorting effect of partial defences on expert evidence.
The Royal College argued that psychiatric evidence of diminished responsibility is inevitably distorted as
it must be made relevant to the verdict rather than the sentence23. The Commission believe making
partial defences available to second degree murder would increase the number of cases in which
psychiatric evidence would be distorted by making it material to the verdict. It might also employ a
supplementary argument that expert opinion would be less distorted when the effect on the offence label
is only to reclassify to a different grade of murder rather than to remove the label of murder altogether,
meaning it has less impact on the verdict.
Another view advanced was that diminished responsibility should have a greater excusatory effect than
provocation. In the consultation exercise conducted by the Commission, Mackay, who has completed
much research on partial defences for the Commission, expressed his preference for diminished
responsibility to reduce first degree murder to manslaughter even if provocation only reduced first degree
murder to second degree murder or indeed was abolished24. The Commission recognise there may be
advantages in this more nuanced approach, but conclude the benefits are outweighed by the drawbacks.
Principally, it seems concerned by pragmatic issues. It cannot countenance a situation in which a jury
agreed the defendant was not guilty of first degree murder, but nevertheless there needed to be a retrial
because it was split between deciding if this should result in second degree murder or manslaughter. This
further demonstrates the breadth of the proposed new offence of second degree murder incorporating
offences of differing intent and, dare one say, culpability. It might seem counter-intuitive, but it appears
that in the proposed new three-tier system, partial defences would find themselves alongside a more
heterogenous group of offences than under the overall less differentiated two-tier system.
19 See Wilson Op. Cit.
20 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para 2.147.
21 For example, see Ashworth in [2007] Crim Law Review.:
333.
22 Crichton J, Darjee R & Chiswick (2004) Diminished
responsibility in Scotland: new case law. Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology. 15(3): 552-565.
23 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
2.153.
24 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
2.134.
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25 Ibid, para 5.11
26 Ibid, para 5.63.
27 Horder J (2005) Reshaping the Subjective Element in the
Provocation Defence. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.
25(123).
28 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.64.
New Provocation
The Commission’s preferred definition of provocation remains unchanged from that advanced in Partial
Defences to Murder: Final Report, save references to duress are removed. The definition is considerably
longer than that it is intended to replace, consisting of sections (1) – (5). Section (1):
“(1) Unlawful homicide that would otherwise be first degree murder should 
instead be second degree murder if:
(a) the defendant acted in response to:
(i) gross provocation (meaning words or conduct or a 
combination of words and conduct) which caused the 
defendant to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged; or
(ii) fear of serious violence towards the defendant or
another; or
(iii) a combination of both (i) and (ii); and
(b) a person of the defendant’s age and of ordinary temperament, i.e., 
ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant 
might have reacted in the same or in a similar way.”25
Subsection (1)(a)(i) may not prove too controversial as it largely reflects the existing state of the law.
However, the additional requirement that the provocation be ‘gross’ suggest that graver words or conduct
may be expected. Subsection (1)(a)(ii), on the other hand, introduces ‘fear of serious violence’ as an
entirely new basis for provocation. This new defence is intended to meet criticisms that the current law
‘goes wrong twice’ for women by making no provision for fear of serious violence to reduce murder to
manslaughter and by permitting reduction in cases where the provoked murder may have been little more
than a reflection of the continuing cultural acceptability of men’s use of violence in anger26. It has been
argued previously that provocation discriminates against women27. This group has been regarded less
likely to kill following a sudden loss of self-control in response to immediately proximal provocation, but
more likely to have done so in fear of continued domestic violence. The Commission accepts that the
current law discriminates by elevating anger to the only (partially) excused emotion and rebalances the
equation by allowing in fear under (1)(a)(ii) & (iii). To right the second perceived wrong, the Commission
has restricted, in its view unambiguously, the scope of provocation in (1)(a)(i)28. It should be noted that
the removal of the requirement for a sudden loss of self-control to be replaced with a more relaxed
approach of not acting in considered desire for revenge also opens up the possibility of other emotions
than anger being permissible. Furthermore, the removal of sudden loss of control means that, depending
on the circumstances, other acts, such as overreaction in self-defence, could satisfy the gross provocation
requirement and result from a justifiable sense of being wronged without the defendant having
experienced anger.
43
Proposed Reforms to Partial Defences and their Implications for Mentally Disordered Defendants
Moving on, subsection (b) begins to set out the standard of conduct expected of the defendant, and this
should be read in conjunction with that which immediately follows:
“(2) In deciding whether a person of the defendant’s age and of ordinary
temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the
circumstances of the defendant, might have reacted in the same or
in a similar way, the court should take into account the defendant’s
age and all the circumstances of the defendant other than matters
whose only relevance to the defendant’s conduct is that they bear
simply on his or her general capacity for self-control.”29
The difficult figure of the ‘reasonable man’ is omitted altogether but there remains an objective standard
in the form of a person of the defendant’s age and of ordinary temperament. However, there exists the
potential for many attributes to be given to this person. The provision for all the circumstances of the
defendant to be taken into account other than matters whose only relevance is to self-control, is arguably
narrower than the current provision in some respects, but wider in others. With regards to the application
of mental state factors to the defence, it means that mental disorder could not be adduced if it is only
relevant to the defendant’s self control. This would bar the defence in cases with similar material facts to
those of the difficult case of Smith (Morgan James)30 in which alcoholism was successfully put forward as
a factor to be taken into account when considering the required level of self-control31. Further, it would
appear that a brain-damaged defendant (similar to the defendant in Luc Thiet Thuan v The Queen32 who
was unsuccessful in pleading provocation) whose only relevant impairment was in self-control, such as
might arise from damage to the frontal lobes of the brain, would not be able to put forward this defence.
This may seem harsh upon a defendant who has an impairment arising from a head injury and prima facie
it is difficult to see why someone with this sort of post-traumatic disorder should be less deserving than
someone with a psychological injury such as post-traumatic stress disorder which predisposed them to a
fear of serious violence, but it ought to be the case under the new proposals that by stating a specific
(in)capacity to control him or herself in the new diminished responsibility definition (see below) any
injustices could be avoided. To this extent the proposals seek to move the effect of mental disorder into
the partial defence of diminished responsibility.
So how would mental disorder apply to the proposed partial defence of provocation? Firstly, mental
disorder would continue to inform the court’s decision as to whether the defendant was sufficiently
provoked to have behaved in the way they did. The Commission gives the example that low intelligence
could be taken into account as part of the circumstances if it meant the defendant misinterpreted a
provocative act, thinking it to be graver than a person of higher intelligence might have done33. More
straightforwardly, mental disorder would apply where it formed the subject of provocative words such as
name-calling. 
Secondly, in allowing all circumstances of the defendant to be taken into account providing they do not
only bear on self-control, the proposed definition opens new areas where mental disorder might apply.
29 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.11.
30 R v Smith (Morgan James)32 [2001] 1 AC 146
31 A different view on alcoholism and self-control was later
taken by the Privy Council in Attorney General for Jersey
v Holley [2005] UKPC 23.
32 Luc Thiet Thuan v The Queen [1997] AC 131
33 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London,.para 5.43.
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This can be observed in relation to the new provision for fear of serious violence at (1)(a)(ii). Courts
would presumably be asked to decide whether the defendant was indeed in fear of serious violence,
paralleling the necessity for them to decide whether defendants relying on (1)(a)(i) were indeed grossly
provoked. In other words, juries would likely be asked to decide on the gravity of the fear claimed by the
defendant. One can imagine how certain mental disorders would be highly relevant to this requirement.
It must be the case that identical acts will induce fear differently depending on the perception of the
defendant which may be strongly influenced by mental disorder. For example, a defendant with post-
traumatic stress disorder (well conceivable in the oft-quoted context of domestic violence) might be more
fearful about the prospect of further enactment of that trauma than another person who did not suffer
from intrusive mental re-experiencing of violence. Another example in relation to fear of serious violence
might be the psychotic patient whose abnormal paranoid ideation predisposes him to interpreting acts of
the victim as threatening. Reading (1)(a)(ii), (1)(b) and (2) together, one might put forward that the
defendant’s reaction arose from fear to which he was predisposed because of a false belief that the victim
wished him harm, developed secondary to auditory hallucinations telling him the same. Furthermore, it
can be seen by this second example that mental disorder factors could be applied to other parts of the
defence insomuch as such paranoid ideation could also be expected to impact upon the justifiable sense
of being wronged in (1)(a)(i). This second example also demonstrates how it appears there would be
considerable overlap between provocation and diminished responsibility.
Next, the third section outlines conditions which bar the defence:
“(3) The partial defence should not apply where:
(a) the provocation was incited by the defendant for the purpose
of providing an excuse to use violence; or
(b) the defendant acted in considered desire for revenge.”34
Subsection (3)(a) clearly excludes cases in which the defendant has induced provocation by the victim
to provide excuse for the subsequent act. This is intended to resolve a moderate degree of confusion that
has arisen. At common law, ‘self-induced’ provocation was not regarded as sufficient. However, the
Homicide Act 1957 required the defence to be put to the jury whenever there was evidence of a provoked
loss of self-control and may have removed the common law restriction35. The Commission believe that
the common law position should be reaffirmed36.
Subsection (b) sounds uncontroversial, but is of particular relevance to the new basis of acting in fear of
serious violence. In fact, acting under considered desire for revenge alone is what is being barred here.
The Commission prefer that some wish for revenge co-existing with a fear of serious violence would not
bar this defence.
Section 4 provides further clarification on the matter of revenge:
“(4) A person should not be treated as having acted in considered
desire for revenge if he or she acted in fear of serious violence,
merely because he or she was also angry towards the deceased for
the conduct which engendered that fear.”37
34 Ibid, para 5.11.
35 See, for example, R v Johnson [1989] Crim LR 738 in
which provocation was not precluded by the fact that the
provocative attack by the victim was a predictable result of
the defendant’s conduct. 
36 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.79..
37 Ibid, para 5.11.
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This section qualifies the bar set out in (3)(b), allowing some anger to coexist with fear of serious violence
without it being construed as revenge, consistent with the general approach of these proposals which
acknowledge the defendant’s behaviour may be influenced by several emotions and mental state factors
simulaneously38.
Section 5 addresses a notable omission in the existing law:
“(5) A judge should not be required to leave the defence to the jury
unless there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly
directed, could conclude that it might apply.”39
Unlike other defences, currently a judge must put the defence of provocation to the jury if there is some
evidence of there being provocative acts or words, even if he or she feels the defence unmeritorious. The
Commission feels this must raise the probability of defences succeeding (indicating, perhaps, limited faith
in the ability of juries to weed out poor claims). It asserts this was probably not the intention of Parliament
in passing the 1957 Act, but rather an oversight. Other passages of the report hint at this being more than
simply a ‘tidying up exercise’, as the proposed ability of the judge to withhold defences from the jury is
relied upon to prevent miscarriages of justice such as successful claims based on revenge-driven acts. 
New Diminished Responsibility
The Law Commission feels that medical science has moved on considerably since diminished
responsibility was placed on the statute books half a century ago and consequently the definition is badly
out of date40. It notes that the existing definition does not make clear that the ‘abnormality of mind’ must
reduce culpability or explain how it does so. Furthermore, the Commission highlight that the use of the
term ‘abnormality of mind’ does not accord well with psychiatric practice41. Its primary recommendation
is to “modernise diminished responsibility so it is both clearer and better able to accommodate developments in
expert diagnostic practice”42. This appears to place expert witnesses’ concerns at the heart of their
proposals. Critics have expressed concern that psychiatrists frequently comment on what has been called
‘the ultimate issue’, in other words that they comment on all factors satisfying the defence including those
which arguably should be left to the jury43. Importantly, the new definition omits the concept of ‘mental
responsibility’ which many have perceived to be a moral judgement. The new defence would be based on
a series of capacity tests that consider specific mental abilities:
“(a) a person who would otherwise be guilty of first degree murder is guilty of second degree
murder if, at the time he or she played his or her part in the killing, his or her capacity to:
(i) understand the nature of his or her conduct; or
(ii) form a rational judgement; or
38 For example, see the proposals for diminished responsibility
which allow a combination of a recognised medical
condition and developmental immaturity. Notably this
section coheres well with the first section of the
provocation proposals where a combination of fear of
serious violence and gross provocation (which may often, if
not always, be expected to result in anger) may provide a
basis. 
39 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para ?..
40 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
1.49.
41 Ibid, para 5.111.
42 Ibid, para 5.107.
43 Mitchell B (1997b) Putting diminished responsibility law
into practice: a forensic psychiatric perspective. Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry. 8(3): 620.
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44 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.112.
45 S. 3 MCA 2005.
46 Mitchell B (1997b) Putting diminished responsibility law
into practice: a forensic psychiatric perspective. Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry. 8(3): 620.
47 Op Cit.
48 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.118.
49 Ibid, para 5.117.
50 M’Naghten’s Case 53 (1843) 10 CI & Fin 200
(iii) control him or herself,
was substantially impaired by an abnormality of mental functioning arising 
from a recognised medical condition, developmental immaturity in a 
defendant under the age of eighteen, or a combination of both;”44
Drawing in this way upon capacity to form the basis of legislation appears congruent with recent trends
in clinical practice and other legislation culminating, of course, in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Indeed
the first two capacities appear familiar, approximating as they both do to elements of the statutory test set
out in the MCA 2005,45 as well as the preceding case law on decision-making capacity. This test may, in
fact, have the effect of formalising the approach to ‘mental responsibility’ frequently taken by experts as
evidence suggests psychiatrists tackle the current requirement for (a substantial impairment of) ‘mental
responsibility’ by disaggregating it into putative component mental abilities46. 
One objection to the current test of a ‘substantial impairment of mental responsibility’ is that the question
of the defendant’s mental responsibility sounds like one of moral and/or legal philosophy and something
in which psychiatric experts do not feel they have special expertise47. However, even if it were accepted
that mental responsibility could be formulated in terms of cognition or mental abilities (and it should be
remembered that notwithstanding their misgivings, most experts do in fact make some comment on
mental responsibility), there is the question of whether any impairment was substantial. Even if an
opinion on mental responsibility has been offered, arguably it only becomes the ‘ultimate issue’ if the
degree of impairment has also been addressed. Perhaps it is not, therefore, such a problem, but the new
formulation would make the respective roles of expert and jury much clearer. It seems that framing
impairment(s) in terms of capacities places the issue firmly in the domain of psychiatry. Helpfully, the text
of the report explains that it is then for the jury to say whether the relevant capacities are ‘substantially
impaired’48. The expert’s role is set out clearly to offer an opinion on:
“(1) whether the D [the defendant] was suffering from an abnormality of mental 
functioning stemming from a recognised medical condition; and 
(2) whether and in what way the abnormality had an impact on D’s capacities, as 
these are explained in the new provisions.”49
It will be noted that only one of the three capacities need be substantially impaired for the defence to
succeed. The first capacity bears some similarity to elements of the test for insanity in England and Wales.
To “understand the nature of his or her conduct” sounds rather like, “to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing” as famously set out in M’Naghten’s Case50. Would the interpretation of ‘nature of conduct’
extend to the moral quality of the act, or in other words, “that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong”? If not, it could be suggested that this would create a paradox because in this regard the full
excusatory effect of insanity would be more available than the partial excusatory defence of diminished
responsibility. 
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51 Homicide Act 1957, s2.
52 Ormerod D (2005) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (11th
Ed). Oxford University Press: Oxford: 469.
53 Mackay R. [1999] The Abnormality of Mind factor in
Diminished Responsibilty. Criminal Law Review: 117.
54 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.114.
55 S2 of the Homicide Act 1957 requires an abnormality of
mind to cause the substantial impairment in mental
responsibilities, which does not accomodate normal
developmental immaturity.
The second limb concerns the defendant’s capacity “to form a rational judgment” and seems to reflect the
conventional requirement in decision-making capacity to weigh up information. Of course, there is
generally no requirement in current law for the decision arrived at to be sensible and presumably neither
would there be here (only the capacity for a rational decision to be made).
Moving on to consider the final paragraph of section (a), it can be seen that ‘abnormality of mental
function’ has replaced the antiquated, although perhaps not excessively problematic, ‘abnormality of
mind’. The Commission highlights that ‘abnormality of mind’ was a legal and not psychiatric term and
feels the new definition has been drafted with the needs and practices of medical experts in mind. More
important, perhaps, is the change to the aetiology of the mental impairment. In existing law there is a
requirement for the abnormality of mind to arise from, “a condition of arrested or retarded development of
mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury”51. This would be replaced with a requirement in
adults for the impairment to arise from ‘a recognised medical condition’. Curiously, the Commission
regarded the existing terms too restrictive. Other authorities believe the terms have never been
satisfactorily defined52. It does seem that a very wide range of mental disorder has been formulated
successfully as one of the three underlying conditions, and there is a strong argument that less serious
mental conditions have been allowed in order to ensure more a lenient sentence or disposal, for example
in cases of so-called ‘mercy killings’ perpetrated by relatives of terminally ill victims53. It is hoped that the
new definition would bring clarity to proceedings and allow psychiatrists to limit themselves to recognised
diagnoses. It was certainly the belief of the Royal College of Psychiatrists that the proposed restriction
would ensure that any such defence was grounded in valid medical diagnosis and would encourage
experts to use recognised psychiatric classification systems54. This has the potential of being more
restrictive towards the perpetrators of mercy killings, although given the likelihood of depressive or
trauma-related symptoms in this group it will surely be possible for the courts to show leniency if it is their
will until the type of wider investigation into euthanasia recommended by the Commission has taken
place. Although, such a development would open up psychiatric classification systems, it would probably
not change dramatically the disorders deemed acceptable as the current definition is broad, but it would
seem to be more accommodating to personality disorders by allowing them to stand as their familiar
clinical classifications rather than having to frame them as arrested development, disease or injury or as
an inherent cause.
The other two changes to the basis of the abnormality in mental functioning/mind relate to defendants
under the age of eighteen. Firstly, the new formulation allows the substantial impairment of mental
functioning to arise from developmental immaturity. This addresses a lacunae in the current law which
means that normal developmental immaturity cannot be allowed to form the basis of the defence55. This
seems important in a jurisdiction where criminal responsibility may be assumed from the age of ten.
Secondly, the final provision which allows a defendant under eighteen to be impaired by a combination
of a recognised medical condition and developmental immaturity obviates the need to separate artificially
these factors in a defendant of that age.
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56 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide. Law Com No. 304, TSO, London, para
5.112.
57 Ibid, para 5.123.
58 Ibid, para 1.54.
Next, the second section of the new definition contains a requirement for a link between the abnormality
of mental functioning and the fatal act or omission:
“(b) the abnormality, the developmental immaturity, or the combination of both 
provides an explanation for the defendant’s conduct in carrying out or taking 
part in the killing.”56
The current law does not make explicit that there must be a link between the abnormality of mind and
the offending behaviour. The new proposal requires an explanation based on the abnormality before the
defence can succeed. The Royal College of Psychiatrists cautioned against a situation where experts might
be called upon to ‘demonstrate’ causation on a scientific basis rather than indicating the likely impact of
the abnormality57. The Commission feel its terms ensured an appropriate connection between the
abnormality of mental function or developmental immaturity and the killing. The phrasing of the
requirement being for an explanation rather than anything stricter (such as the explanation) suggests the
test does not require the connection to be demonstrated as an absolute truth at the expense of other
explanations, which no doubt would have caused the Royal College concern. This seems based in realism
and to reflect the level of evidence involved, which by its nature must be speculative. 
Nevertheless, section (b) does call for the link between the abnormality of mental functioning and the
act or omission to be made clearer than under the current regime. The current term ‘mental
responsibility’ is vague and open to conjecture about moral connotations as described above. It seems that
read together, the specific capacities in subsections (a) (i) - (iii) and the explanation required in section
(b) mean that overall there is a requirement for the essential problem or disability at the heart of the
defence to be made much more explicit.
Other Potential Defences
Alongside provocation and diminished responsibility, the Commission considered several other potential
defences as part of the review: duress, infanticide, mercy killing, killing pursuant to a suicide pact and
insanity.
Duress
Duress is a general defence that is uniquely unavailable to murder. The Commission felt at all stages of
the exercise that this was not right. Circumstances involving duress arise when the defendant becomes
involved in the killing of an innocent person but only because he or she is personally threatened with
death or with a life-threatening injury and the only way to avoid the threat is to participate in the
killing58. Under current law, the defendant would be convicted of murder and given the mandatory life
sentence. The Commission point out that sentencing guidelines do not even mention duress as a
mitigating factor for murder. 
Interestingly, the Commission had initially proposed to make duress another partial defence, which won
the support of consultees. However, it reconsiders, thinking this could lead to undue complexity in other
areas of homicide citing the difficulty in applying it to second degree murder, attempted murder and
manslaughter. Instead, it has gone further and proposes it should be a full defence.
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Infanticide
The offence of infanticide will be familiar to many expert witnesses and others. What may be less well
understood is that infanticide can also be advanced as a partial defence after a charge of murder has been
made. The Commission finds no problem with the current definition, or its position within the structure
of homicide, but rather with the procedure for ensuring that evidence of a mother’s mental disturbance
at the time of the killing is heard at trial59. It is concerned that in cases where the defendant denies killing
their infant they are unlikely to submit to a psychiatric examination and so are likely to be convicted of
murder as they are, for the same reason, unlikely to run with any other defence dependent on mental
state. The Commission proposes a new post-trial procedure in these cases:
“[I]n circumstances where infanticide is not raised as an issue at trial and the 
defendant (biological mother of a child aged 12 months or less) is convicted by the 
jury of murder [first degree or second degree murder], the trial judge should have the 
power to order a medical examination of the defendant with a view to establishing 
whether or not there is evidence that at the time of the killing the requisite elements of 
a charge of infanticide were present. If such evidence is produced and the defendant 
wishes to appeal, the judge should be able to refer the application to the Court of 
Appeal and to postpone sentence pending determination of the application.”60
The procedure around murder is already unusual in that all defendants should have a psychiatric report.
The difference with this suggestion is that the first instance judge would refer the case to the Court of
Appeal so an opinion could be obtained.
‘Mercy Killing’
The Commission was tasked with considering euthanasia only inasmuch as it formed part of the law of
murder and not more widely. It has decided any substantive recommendation on this subject should wait
for a more detailed consultation on the issue. It recommends a separate exercise examining whether the
law should recognise a separate offence of mercy killing or a partial defence of this type61.
Killing Pursuant to a Suicide Pact
This is already a partial defence to murder under the 1957 Act. The Commission’s starting position was
that this provision should be repealed. However, in the light of its decision not to pursue a mercy killing
defence without specific consultation, it recommends retaining killing pursuant to a suicide pact as a
defence at this stage62.
Insanity
The complete defence of insanity fell within the terms of reference of the review, but the Commission has
decided not to address it, indicating it was not an area of law that seemed to give rise to real difficulty or
anomaly63. It makes no firm conclusions about how insanity would operate alongside their proposed new
provocation and diminished defences. The Commission hypothesises the new defences could be
interpreted more or less restrictively than the current law, thus making insanity more or less likely to be
59 Ibid, para 1.51.
60 Ibid, para 8.46.
61 Ibid, para 7.49.
62 Ibid, para 7.50.
63 Ibid, para 1.2-3. However in its report ‘Tenth Programme
of Law Reform’ (11/6/08), the Law Commission list
‘Consideration of unfitness to plead and the insanity
defence’ as one of their ‘new projects’.
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advanced instead. Finally, it does not think its recommendations removes the theoretical distinction
between insanity as an ‘all-or-nothing’ defence and diminished responsibility as a partial defence
representing a point on a scale of mental responsibility.
What Next? The Government’s Response
The Commission has not published draft legislation with its report as it usually does with less
controversial legislation. Instead, it recognises that further consultation will be needed before this can be
taken forward. The Ministry of Justice finally responded in December 2007 with a brief written ministerial
statement which outlined the Government’s plans. It has decided to proceed on a ‘step by step basis’ and
look first at:
“(1) reformed partial defences to murder of diminished responsibility and 
provocation (including the use of excessive force in self-defence); 
(2) reformed offences of complicity in relation to homicide; and 
(3) improved procedures for dealing with infanticide.”64
The statement by the junior minister goes on to express the Government belief that, “it is right to deal with
these crucial elements of the existing law before going on to consider the wider structural proposals from the Law
Commission”65. Finally, the minister promises to publish draft clauses for consultation in Summer 2008
prior to introducing any necessary legislation.
Prima facie, the Government’s approach does not seem entirely consistent with that of the Law
Commission. After all, the wider review of the homicide law followed the Commission’s assertion that
partial defences could not be examined in isolation, but needed to be considered alongside their position
and effect in homicide law as a whole. There must be a suspicion that the Government may revise the
definitions of provocation and diminished responsibility but take reform no further. At the very least they
have decided upon a process which would allow this to happen and which weakens the argument that
reform of the definitions of partial defences and the structure of homicide law are inseparable. In short,
the Commission’s ‘risky subterfuge’ regarding mandatory sentencing will not have paid off unless the
Government eventually takes this review to a second step and is willing to countenance a discretionary
sentence for some types of murder.
On balance, this article finds the definitions advanced by the Commission are somewhat broader than
those currently in force. Overall, viewing the whole package of proposals, any increased availability of
these defences appears to be balanced by a reduction in the excusatory effect of a successful plea to the
(albeit important) one of allowing flexible sentencing. If the Government accepts the Commission’s
definitions, it may be a desire to revisit the overall balance of reform that drives the review process
forward to a second step.
64 http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/announcement_121207a.htm
65 Op Cit.
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Conclusions
Precipitated by problems with partial defences to murder, the UK Government asked the Law
Commission to review homicide law as a whole. Its resulting proposals would radically restructure
homicide law and make substantial revisions to provocation and diminished responsibility. It would also
introduce duress as a full defence to murder and make important changes to infanticide. The Commission
recommends the Government hold the debate around euthanasia elsewhere and retains killing pursuant
to a suicide pact until such a consultation has been completed.
The Commission’s proposals would change the definition of the partial defences and the effect of a
successful plea. The scope of provocation would broaden and be available to those who acted in fear of
serious violence. It is hoped this would prevent injustice to abused female defendants. The troublesome
figure of ‘the reasonable man’ has been omitted altogether, and with it some of the relevance of mental
disorder in homicide to provocation. The Commission has signalled a clear desire to move much of the
effect of mental disorder on self-control ‘into’ diminished responsibility but has opened up new areas
where mental disorder could be relevant to provocation as well as retaining its relevance to the gravity of
provocation.
The new definition of diminished responsibility is capacity-based. Two of the capacities will be familiar to
any doctor who has been concerned with assessing their patient’s decision-making ability, but the third
(for self-control) is less familiar and arguably has the potential to make this defence more available to
defendants with personality disorder and other disorders. The new definition appears to place assessment
of the relevant impairment incontrovertibly in the domain of psychiatry. However, experts would not be
expected to comment on the ultimate issue of whether the entire defence is satisfied. Crucially, the
Commission expects juries to decide on the critical degree of impairment present. Other changes attempt
to anchor the relevant abnormality in contemporary psychiatric diagnoses, recognise the role of normal
developmental immaturity and make explicit the link between abnormality of mental functioning and the
fatal act or omission.
The overall effect of the proposals might be seen as balanced in terms of the sympathy and excuse offered
to mentally disordered offenders. The new provocation test would allow a greater number of defendants
to plead this defence successfully, especially female defendants with the psychiatric sequelae of trauma.
Most mental health concerns excluded from the self-control limb of provocation should be absorbed into
diminished responsibility. The diminished responsibility test is more detailed than that it is intended to
replace, but as only one of the newly-identified capacities need be substantially impaired, more
defendants may ‘pass’ the test. The increased availability is contrasted by the reduced effect of a successful
plea. The defences would only reduce first degree murder to second degree murder. The Commission
argues that flexible sentencing is the only allowance this group of offenders absolutely require to meet
justice. However, it cannot be entirely unimportant that these offenders will no longer be convicted of
manslaughter but rather be labelled as ‘murderers’, albeit of a lesser degree.
The overall package of reform proposed is a most interesting one with several attractions, but will also
present significant challenges to mentally disordered defendants, their legal representatives and those
submitting psychiatric evidence. The momentum now lies with the Government which, with regard to
partial defences, has decided to first review provocation and diminished responsibility definitions as well
as procedural aspects of infanticide, before there is any possibility of advancing a further step to consider
the Commission’s other proposals. Further consultation with interested parties is promised and it is clear
that this process of review which started in 2003 is some way from being completed.
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